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THE FCC, CABLE TV, AND VISIONS OF VALHALLA:
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF COMPLEX RULEMAKING AND
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Allen E. Shoenberger*
A number of recent decisions by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia,' its counterpart for the Eighth
Circuit,2 and the United States Supreme Court,3 have substantially
curtailed the power of the FCC to regulate the growth of cable
television. Such regulation has proved to be a very complicated and
extended saga of FCC activity,' one measure of which was the ex-
traordinary justification for publishing a per curiam opinion in
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC: "not because it has received less
than full consideration by the court, but because the complexity of
the issues raised on appeal made it useful to share the effort re-
quired to draft this opinion among the members of the panel."5
Both the per curiam opinion for the D.C. Circuit' and the opinion
of Judge Markey7 for the Eighth Circuit are extended treatments of
the complicated administrative and constitutional issues raised.
Conversely, the opinion by the Supreme Court treated a very narrow
aspect of these problems." The thrust of this article is primarily to
* B.A., Swarthmore College, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969; LL.M., New York
University, 1972; Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. The author
thanks his research assistant, Mark Barenholtz, who labored so long helping to clarify these
complex issues.
1. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
2. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd 99 S.Ct. 1435 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Midwest Video?. The Supreme Court's treatment of these issues will
be discussed in notes 168-201 infra and accompanying text. The focus of this article remains
on the treatment of similar issues at the level of the United States courts of appeals.
3. 99 S.Ct. 1435 (1979).
4. See, e.g., the diary of FCC activity with respect to subscription television, in Home Box
Office, 567 F.2d at 17 n.5. For an excellent article and citations to the enormous amount of
literature in the area of cable television see, The F.C.C.'s Cable Television Jurisdiction
Deregulation by Judicial Fiat, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 218 (1978).
5. 567 F.2d at 17 n.1.
6. Wright, MacKinnon, circuit judges, and Weigel, district judge, sitting by designation.
7. Chief judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, Ste-
phenson and Webster, circuit judges. Judge Webster is currently the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
8. For a discussion of the Supreme Court opinion, see part VII of this article.
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question the propriety of parts of the two courts of appeals' deci-
sions, both in constitutional law and administrative law. The treat-
ment by the Supreme Court only emphasizes some of the issues
raised herein? In particular, all of the decisions raise significant
questions about the capacity of the administrative agencies and/or
Congress and the courts to deal with increasingly complicated tech-
nical, economic, legal, and political problems. Each of the cases
deals with administrative rulemaking, and in particular with rules
having potentially far ranging impact upon the social, political and
personal life of large segments of the American public.
This article will first discuss these.courts of appeals decisions with
reference to their treatment of the scope of the jurisdictional grant
by Congress to the FCC. It will be argued that inadequate deference
was given the FCC's own determination that it possessed jurisdic-
tion to rulemake, and that neither decision adequately reflects con-
siderations of the appropriate locale for decisionmaking. The ques-
tion of which of the courts, congress or the agencies is the proper
locus of decisionmaking is explored and a conceptual framework
suggested based upon the idea of institutional competence. There
are serious risks associated with improper assignment of the locale
for decision. Moreover, these court opinions exemplify the danger of
misuse of one of the judiciary's most powerful institutional
strengths, a search for justification. Courts may demand so many
additional levels of justification and consistency from the agencies
that in practical terms no agency can ultimately rulemake. This
danger is particularly acute with such complicated issues as the
ones treated in these cases. Yet, only the dissent in the Supreme
Court closes with the primary issue, who ought to decide.
The core question is twofold, encompassing first legal, and second
policy considerations. First, to what extent has Congress delegated
power to the FCC to regulate the development of cable television.
Second, does Congress and/or the FCC have the capacity as institu-
9. In the majority of cases, review of significant rulemaking activity by federal agencies
stops at the level of the various courts of appeals. Thus only one of these decisions was
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court's treatment of the decision
reviewed dealt only with a small part of the decision below. The remainder, including signifi-
cant holdings on jurisdictional issues, as well as the style of analysis by both courts of appeals,
remains as precedent for other courts of appeals to follow. The limited Supreme Court review
of one of the court of appeals decisions is treated below at part VI.
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tions to shape authoritatively at this moment an industry so caught
up in flux. Judge Markey, for example, described the FCC rules on
mandatory access as, "consistently and continually revised, unen-
forced, withdrawn, waivered and abandoned."'' 0 The core considera-
tion in the policy context of such a statement is whether it indicates
the need for Congressional intervention or, alternatively, indicates
the health and vitality of the administrative process.
I. THE ACCESS DISPUTE
The dispute in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC" centered on the
major changes in cable television regulations promulgated by the
FCC in its 1976 Report.'2 These changes dealt with the right of
access to a cable television system by persons other than the owners
of the system. The three major changes in these rules accomplished
by the 1976 Report were:
(1) The access rules were no longer applicable to a system depend-
ing upon whether or not the system was located within the top 100
marketplaces for television. Instead, the rules were applicable to
systems with 3500 or more subscribers.' 3
(2) A prior requirement that all cable television systems must
have the capacity to carry 20-channels was extended from March 31,
1977 until June 21, 1986 for most, but not all, existing systems. "
(3) Four public access channels were required only of systems
bearing sufficient capacity and demand for full-time access. Other
systems could conglomerate access on one or more channels. '1 The
four channels were to include one education channel and one local
government channel to be offered without charge for the first five
years. 6
10. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1033 n.17.
11. Midwest Video, supra note 2.
12. Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 Report].
13. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1033-34, 1976 Report, supra note 12, at 303-06 (citing
47 C.F.R. § 76.252-56 (1976)).
14. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1033-34, 1976 Report, supra note 12, at 321-24 (citing
47 C.F.R. § 76.252(b) (1976)).
15. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1034, 1976 Report, supra note 12, at 314-16 (citing 47
C.F.R. § 76.254 (1976)).
16. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(1) (1976). Judge Markey, in Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1034,
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These rules were challenged in Midwest Video as: "(1) inade-
quately supported by the record (2) beyond the jurisdiction of the
Commission (3) violative of the free speech clause of the first
amendment and (4) violative of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.' ' 7
The Eighth Circuit, per Judge Markey, held that the dispositive
issue was the jurisdictional issue and invalidated the regulations"
listed the major rules as follows:
(1) that operators of cable systems having 3500 or more subscribers designate at least
four channels for access users, one channel each for public access, education access,
local government access, and leased access. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a).
(2) that, until demand exists for full time use of all four access channels, access
programming may be combined on one or more channels. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(b).
(3) that at least one full channel for shared access be provided, but if a system had
insufficient activated channel capacity on June 21, 1976, it could provide whatever
portions of channels are available for such purposes. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(c).
(4) that at least one public access channel be forever supplied without charge. 47
C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(2).
(5) that a reasonable charge for production costs may be charged for live studio
programs longer than five minutes. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(3).
(6) that operators establish rules providing for acceis on a first-come, nondiscrimi-
natory basis and prohibiting the transmission of lottery information, obscene or inde-
cent matter, and commercial and political advertising. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d)(1) (on
public channel). 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d)(2) (on educational channel).
(7) that cable operators exercise no other control over content of access programs. 47
C.F.R. § 76.256(b).
(8) that educational and local government access be offered without charge for the
first five years. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(1).
(9) that operators establish rules for leased access channels on a first-come, nondis-
criminatory basis, requiring sponsorship identification and an appropriate rate sched-
ule, with no control over program content except to prohibit lottery information and
obscene or indecent material. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d)(3).
(10) that each cable supply equipment and facilities for local production and presen-
tation of access and lease programs. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(a).
(11) that equipment in new cable systems have a capacity of two-way, nonvoice
communication and a minimum of 20 channels. 47 C.F.R. § 76.252(a).
(12) that cable systems in operation within a major television market before March
31, 1972, and other systems in operation before March 31, 1977, shall have ten years
from the effective date (June 21, 1976) of the 1976 Report to comply. 47 C.F.R. §
76.252(b).
17. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1029.
18. Id. at 1035. The Eighth Circuit also dealt with the issue of whether the FCC had not
impermissibly made the cable systems into common carriers. That issue became the disposi-
tive issue in the view of the United States Supreme Court. See notes 168-204 infra and
accompanying text. However, that part of. the opinion by Judge Markey received little em-
phasis in the context of the entire decision. It takes up only two of the thirty-four pages of
the decision by the Eighth Circuit. See Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1050-52.
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"because: (1) the [FCC] statute provides no jurisdiction; (2) the
regulations are not 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's res-
ponsibilities for regulation of broadcast television; (3) objectives do
not confer jurisdiction; (4) the Commission's ends do not justify its
means; (5) the means are forbidden within the Commission's statu-
tory jurisdiction." 9
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion, it did so without discussing this part of the opinion. 20
II. THE Home Box Office DISPUTE
This case dealt with the "pay cable" rules promulgated by the
FCC in its Second Report and Order,2 which had the effect of
19. Id. at 1035.
20. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 99 S.Ct. 1435 (1979). The Supreme Court review of this
decision will be dealt with below at part VII.
21. The "pay cable" rules are set forth in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 18-19
n.8 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975)) as follows:
Cable television system operators or channel lessees engaging in origination or access
cablecasting operations for which a per-program or per channel [sic] charge is made
shall comply with the following requirements:
(a) Feature films shall not be cablecast by a cable television system subject to the
mandatory signal carriage requirements of Subpart D of this Part 76, except as pro-
vided in this paragraph.
(1) A feature film may be cablecast if-
Ci) The film has been in general release in theaters anywhere in the United
States for three (3) years or less prior to its proposed cablecast;
(ii) A conventional television broadcast station licensed in the market of
the cable television system holds a present contractual right to exhibit the
film. For purposes of this subdivision, a television station affiliated with a
television network will be deemed to hold a present contractual right to
exhibit a film if the network to which it is affiliated holds such a right;
(iii) The film has been in general release in theaters anywhere in the United
States for more than ten (10) years prior to its proposed cablecast and the
film has not been exhibited in the market of the cable television system over
conventional television for three (3) years prior to its proposed cablecast.
Once a film has been cablecast in the market pursuant to this subdivision,
or broadcast on a subscription basis pursuant to § 73.643(a)(1)(iii), such film
may thereafter be cablecast in the market without regard to its subsequent
exhibition over conventional television;
(iv) The film is in a foreign language;
(2) Feature films otherwise excluded by this parag[r]aph may be cablecast
upon a convincing showing to the Commission that they are not desired for
exhibition over conventional television in the market of the cable television
system, or that the owners of the broadcast rights to the films, even absent the
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existence of subscription television, would not make the films available to con-
ventional television.
(3) Every cable television system operator or channel lessee engaging in origin-
ation or access cablecasting pursuant to this paragraph shall maintain, or cause
to be maintained, for public inspection a file listing the title of the film, the date
on which it was cablecast and the provision of this paragraph pursuant to which
it was cablecast. When a feature film is cablecast pursuant to paragraph
(a)(1)(ii) of this section, the station or network serving the market and holding
a present contractual right to exhibit the film shall be specified. These files shall
be retained for a period of two years.
(b) Sports events shall not be cablecast live by a cable television system subject to
the mandatory signal carriage requirements of Subpart D of Part 76, except as pro-
vided in this paragraph.
(1) A specific event may be cablecast if the event has not been broadcast live
over conventional television in the market of the cable television system during
any one of the five (5) seasons preceding the proposed cablecast. If a regularly
recurring event takes place at intervals of more than one year (e.g., summer
Olympic games), the event shall not be cablecast if it has been broadcast live
over conventional television in the market during any one of the ten (10) years
preceding the proposed cablecast.
(2) New specific sports events that result from the restructuring of existing
sports shall not be cablecast until five (5) seasons after their first occurrence.
Thereafter, subscription cablecasts shall be governed by paragraph (b)(1) of this
section.
(3) The number of non-specific events which may be cablecast in any given
season shall be determined as follows:
(i) If less than twenty-five (25) percent of the events in a category of non-
specific events were broadcast live over conventional television in the market
of the cable television system during each of the five (5) seasons preceding
the proposed cablecast, the number of events in the category cablecast shall
not exceed the number of events in the category not broadcast in that season
among the preceding five (5) seasons when the largest number of events in
the category were broadcast.
(ii) If twenty-five (25) percent or more of the events in a category of non-
specific events were broadcast live over conventional television in the market
of the cable television system during any one of the five (5) seasons preceding
the proposed cablecast, the number of events in the category cablecast shall
not exceed fifty (50) perceent of the number of events in the category not
broadcast in that season among the preceding five (5) seasons when the
largest number of events in the category were broadcast. However, if the
number of events in the category to be broadcast in the current season is a
reduction from the number of events broadcast in that season among the
preceding five (5) seasons when the largest number of events in the category
were broadcast, the number of events in the category which may be cablecast
pursuant to this subparagraph shall be reduced in proportion to the reduc-
tion in events broadcast.
(c) Not more than ninety (90) percent of the total cablecast programming hours shall
consist of feature films and sports events combined. The percentage calculations may
be made on a yearly basis, but absent a showing of good cause, the percentage of such
programming hours may not exceed ninety-five (95) percent of the total cablecast
programming hours in any calendar month.
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sharply curtailing the ability of a cable caster22 to present feature
films and sports programs if a special charge is made for this mate-
rial, i.e., the idea of the home box office. 23 In addition, the rules
limited to ninety percent the time that may be spent on movies and
sports programs and barred commercial advertising on cable chan-
nels on which a direct viewer charge is placed. 24
These rules were challenged as a major, unexplained and hence
arbitrary change of prior Commission policy. 25 The circuit court
held: that the power of the FCC to regulate cable television extends
only "to the extent 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's juris-
diction over broadcast television; ' 2 that the purposes of such regu-
lation are limited at the outer boundary by allowing the Commis-
sion to achieve "long established" goals or the protection of its
"ultimate purposes; '27 and that this standard is not met by the
Commission's rules which prevent "siphoning" of feature films and
sports material from conventional broadcast television to pay cable
in the absence of sufficient demonstration that the Commission's
objectives are ones "for which the Commission could legitimately
regulate the broadcast media." Moreover, the Commission failed
to explain adequately why it was concerned with "siphoning" 29 or
indeed that siphoning will cause harm.' The Commission also failed
(d) No commercial advertising announcements shall be carried on subscription chan-
nels during such operations except before and after such programs for promotion of
other programs for which a per-program or per-channel charge is made.
47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975), as amended by Second Report and Order, 40 F.R. 52731 (1975), 35
RADIo REG.2d (P. & F.) 767 (1975).
22. The origination of signals on a cable television system.
23. These rules only applied if a cable system also carried signals broadcast over the
airways. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5(a), 76.225 (1975).
24. For purposes of this article the entire issue of subscription broadcast television stations
(over the air broadcasting which can only be received by viewers for a fee or charge) has been
ignored. Rules similar to the rules cited above in footnote 21 were also promulgated by the
F.C.C., 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1975) as amended by Second Report and Order in Docket 19554,
40 F.R. 52731 (1975), 35 RADio REG.2d (P. & F.) 767 (1975). Those rules were upheld in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 18 (1977).
25. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 17-18 (1977).
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id. at 34. The court notes that in oral argument the vocabulary of the Commission had
changed from the pejorative "siphoning" to the more neutral term "migration." Id. at 21 n.20.
29. Id. at 36-37.
30. Id. at 39.
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to demonstrate adequately a basis for its conclusions relating to
various anti-trust issues.3' In addition, although challenged on var-
ious first amendment grounds and held not to be content regula-
tions, 32 the court held the no-advertising rules, the ninety percent
rules and the sports and feature film rules were not sufficiently
justified on the record as serving an important and substantial
government interest.3 3 In any case, due process required setting
aside the results of the informal rulemaking in this case because of
widespread ex parte contacts with commissioner or commission
employees.3 1
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT TO THE FCC
Underlying the general and a number of the specific holdings of
the decisions are all three courts' doubts that Congress has con-
ferred as broad a scope of power upon the FCC to regulate CATV,
as the FCC has asserted. In two earlier cases the United States
Supreme Court, however, had upheld the power of the FCC to assert
jurisdiction over some aspects of CATV.
In the first case, United States v. Southwestern Cable,35 a very
narrow issue was presented to the Court. The FCC had promulgated
various rules regulating the rights of CATV stations to import dis-
tant television signals into the top 100 television markets" and re-
quiring CATV systems to carry the signals of stations located in the
service area of a CATV system. The validity of the specific rules was
not an issue, but only whether the FCC had the authority under the
31. Id. at 40-43. The court found that the Commission inadequately resolved traditional
antitrust objections to the strengthening of broadcasters' monopoly over the feature films and
sports broadcasting industries. Further, the Commission failed to take into account the
negative impact of the rules on its otherwise long-standing policy favoring diversification of
control of programming choices. The court also failed to justify how the public interest
considerations which underlie the rule outweigh the public interest considerations in support
of unfettered competition.
32. Id. at 49.
33. Id. at 49-50.
34. Id. at 57. The Commission provided a 60 page document in response to the sua sponte
order by the court. The document indicated numerous contacts by each of the 15 parties
before the court as well as with members of Congress, members of the trade press and
representatives of various performing arts groups. Id. at 52. See especially Id. at 52 nn.108 &
109. Circuit Judge MacKinnon concurred specially on this part of the opinion at 61.
35. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
36. Id. at 162-67.
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Communication Act to regulate CATV systems, and if so whether
it had the specific authority in the case to issue the prohibitory order
restraining importation of a television signal from Los Angeles into
the San Diego area pending hearing.37 The Court ruled that the
Communications Act of 19343 granting the FCC authority to regu-
late broadcasting and other communications "amply suffice[s] to
reach respondents' [CATV] activities"39 and rejected arguments
that such importation within California was not interstate. More-
over, the Court rejected the argument that the FCC lacked power
to regulate CATV because the FCC had unsuccessfully sought guid-
ance from Congress about its authority to regulate CATV.4 0 Instead,
the Court characterized the requests of Congress as merely evidence
of uncertainty about authority as well as "understandable prefer-
ence for more detailed policy guidance than the Communication Act
now provides."' The opinion emphasized that in 1934 Congress had
acted in a field "both new and dynamic" and therefore gave the
Commission, "a comprehensive mandate," with, "not niggardly but
expansive powers. '42 Therefore, "the Commission reasonably con-
cluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to
perform with effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities. 14 3
The Commission thus acted properly to protect the effectiveness of
its regulatory policies with respect to UHF and educational TV
broadcasters," for the unregulated explosive growth of CATV had
jeopardized the policy of encouraging both UHF and educational
37. Id. at 166-67.
38. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(a) and 153(a), (b) (1976).
39. 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968).
40. Id. at 170.
41. Id. The Court noted that the 1966 request for legislation requested Congress to
"'confirm [the Commission's] jurisdiction and . . . establish such basic national policy as
it deems appropriate.'" Id. at 170 n.31 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
16 (1966)). The one time Congress did take affirmative action regarding cable television was
in the context of the revision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1976). The impact has
been in part to reverse the results of a number of Supreme Court decisions such as Tele-
prompter Corp. v. C.B.S., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). The results of the congressional intervention
were aptly described by Professor Gorman: "The cable-television provisions are by far the
most lengthy and complex provision of the new Copyright Act. They must be perused to be
believed, if not understood." Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 856, 878 (1978).
42. 392 U.S. at 173 (citing N.B.C. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 176.
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TV.45 Moreover, Congress endorsed both these purposes." The Court
then stated:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commis-
sion's authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the
authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to
that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broad-
casting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue "such rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions not
inconsistent with law," as "public convenience, interest or necessity
requires." 47 U.S.C. § 303(r). We express no views as to the Commis-
sion's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under other circumstances
or for any other purposes.47
In the second case, United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,48 the
Supreme Court once again upheld the power of the FCC in a limited
area of regulation of CATV. In this case, the Supreme Court dealt
with the FCC rules requiring that CATV systems with 3,500 or more
subscribers originate programming themselves." Justice Brennan
announced the judgment of the Court (three other justices joined his
opinion) which held the rules within the Commission's power were
"reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."" Ear-
lier in the opinion Justice Brennan noted that the Commission's
concern was "not just a matter of avoidance of adverse effects, but
extends also to requiring CATV affirmatively to further statutory
policies." 5' Justice Brennan asserted that:
45. Id. at 175.
46. Id. at 174-75.
47. Id. at 178.
48. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
49. On October 24, 1969, the Commission adopted a rule which provided that "no CATV
system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast
station unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting
and has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other than
automated services." Id. at 653-54 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a), revised on other grounds,
47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1972)).
50. Id. at 663.
51. Id. at 653 (quoting from 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 422 (1968)).
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[Tihe Commission's legitimate concern in the regulation of CATV
is not limited to controlling the competitive impact CATV may have
on broadcast services. Southwestern refers to the Commission's
"various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcast-
ing."
These are considerably more numerous than simply assuring that
broadcasting stations operating in the public interest do not go out
of business . . . .Since the avoidance of adverse effects is itself the
furtherance of statutory policies, no sensible distinction even in
theory can be drawn along those lines. More important, CATV sys-
tems, no less than broadcast stations . . . may enhance as well as
impair the appropriate provision of broadcast services. Consequently
to define the Commission's power in terms of the protection, as op-
posed to the advancement, of broadcasting objectives would artifi-
cially constrict the Commission in the achievement of its statutory
purposes and be inconsistent with our recognition in Southwestern
"that it was precisely because Congress wished, 'to maintain, through
appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of
radio transmission,' . . . that it conferred upon the Commission a
'unified jurisdiction' and 'broad authority.' 52
Justice Brennan described the critical question as whether the Com-
mission reasonably determined that the origination rule would fur-
ther the achievement of long established regulatory goals.53 The
Court found that the Commission's determination was reasonable. 4
Chief Justice Burger, however, cast the deciding vote in that case
and asserted in his concurring opinion:
[T]he Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the
open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions
of the Commission and the courts. The almost explosive development
of CATV suggests the need of a comprehensive re-examination of the
statutory scheme as it relates to this new development, so that the
basic policies are considered by Congress and not left entirely to the
Commission and the courts."
52. Id. at 664-65.
53. Id. at 667.
54. Id. at 668.
55. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1979]
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The Chief Justice expressed his doubts about the correctness of
the decision by the Commission, but deferred to the Commission's
"generations of experience" and "feel" for the problem."
Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion" which asserted
that: "Compulsory origination of programs is. . .a far cry from the
regulations of communications approved in Southwestern Cable. "18
In particular, origination requirements required CATV owners to
invest in new equipment and an entirely new and different cast of
personnel.59 Justice Douglas also asserted: "The upshot of today's
decision is to make the Commission's authority over activities
'ancillary' to its responsibilities greater than its authority over any
broadcast licensee.94 0
IV. THE STANDARD IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Both the courts of appeals in Home Box Office' and in Midwest
Video62 interpreted these decisions by the Supreme Court as mark-
ing the outer parameters of the power of the FCC. The Home Box
Office opinion interprets the Supreme Court decisions as allowing
the Commission to act only for ends for which it could also regulate
broadcast television, and to go no further than to regulate to achieve
"long established" goals or to protect its "ultimate purposes. 6 3
Both courts of appeals also emphasize the importance of the
"reasonably ancillary" standard."
The opinions by the courts of appeals, however, display a
cramped reading of the Supreme Court opinions in Southwestern
56. Id.
57. Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist joined in that dissent.
58. 406 U.S. at 647-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 648.
60. Id. at 681.
61. 567 F.2d at 28.
62. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1038.
63. 567 F.2d at 28. Judge Markey described the mandatory access, channel construction
and equipment availability rules as ones that "burst through the outer limits of the Commis-
sion's delegated jurisdiction." Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1038.
64. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1037-40; 567 F.2d at 27 ("reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of televi-
sion broadcasting." (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178
(1968)).
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Cable'5 and United States v. Midwest Video." Moreover, this article
will argue that all four opinions evidence inadequate deference to
the determinations of the FCC as to its own jurisdiction.
A. The Cramped Reading of the Supreme Court Opinions
First, it is most important to recognize that the decisions of the
Supreme Court in both earlier cases resulted in a finding that juris-
diction exists. Thus, the Supreme Court needed to consider only the
existence of jurisdiction in those particular cases. The Court did not
reach, for it did not need to, the outer parameters of FCC jurisdic-
tion. As Justice Brennan asserted in United States v. Midwest
Video, Southwestern sustained the jurisdiction, "of the Federal
Communications Commisson to regulate the new industry, at least
to the extent 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of tele-
vision broadcasting.' M6 7
Second, both decisions by the courts of appeals appear to place
great weight in their analyses upon the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Burger in United States v. Midwest Video."5 Judge J. Skelly
Wright of the D.C. Circuit, however, has accurately described the
"United States v. Midwest Video precedent [as] .. .not as fragile
as my brethren appear to believe."6
Judge Wright further observed:
It is of course true that the Chief Justice, whose vote determined the
outcome in [United States v.] Midwest Video, expressed his feeling
that "the Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the
open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions
65. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
66. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
67. Id. at 650-51 (emphasis added).
68. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
69. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 630 (D. C. Cir. 1976)
(dissenting opinion). The case invalidated FCC regulations governing cable system leased
access channels that provide two-way, point-to-point, non-video communications. Circuit
Judge Wilkey wrote the opinion invalidating the regulations on two grounds: (1) for failing
to meet the "ancillary to broadcasting" standard; and (2) for falling within the bar of 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976). Section 152(b) denies the Commission authority over intra-state
common carrier applications. Circuit Judge Lumbard concurred solely on the basis of the first
ground. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented on both grounds.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of the Commission and the courts.". .. Yet this expression of doubt
was sandwiched among paragraphs explaining the need to allow the
Commission "wide latitude" in the absence of congressional action
to accommodate the terms of the Communications Act to new devel-
opments in the field of communications. Moreover, the decisive fac-
tor for the Chief Justice was that cable systems are "dependent to-
tally on broadcast signals . ..." By "interrupt[ing] the signal and
put[ting] it to their own use for profit, they take on burdens, one of
which is regulation by the Commission."7
The context of both of these decisions by the Supreme Court,
however, is the examination of the scope of congressional delegation
to the FCC. In that context, the most important text is not that of
the opinions of the Supreme Court, but rather the statutory text.
The language of section 2(a) (now section 152(a)) of the Communi-
cations Act,7' is broad and has been recognized by the Supreme
Court as a grant of regulatory power. 2 That section provides in part:
"The provisions of this [Act] shall apply to all interstate and for-
eign communication by wire or radio . . . which originates and/or
is received within the United States and to all persons engaged
within the Unied States in such communication . . . ,,13 "[Given]
• . . the evidence of congressional intent that [t]he Commission
was expected to serve as the 'single Government agency' with
'unified jurisdiction' and regulatory power over all forms of electri-
cal communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or
radio, ' 74 a narrow reading of the power of the FCC appears out of
place.
While the language used by Chief Justice Burger in his concurr-
ence in United States v. Midwest Video M appears to sanction a
narrow reading, it is important to recognize the practical result of
the holding. United States v. Midwest Video7 held that the FCC
70. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d at 630 (quoting Burger, C.J.,
in United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 675-76).
71. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
72. See United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 660, where Justice Brennan asserts
that Southwestern so held.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
74. 406 U.S. at 659-60 (quoting from United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
at 167-68).
75. 406 U.S. 649. See also, note 48 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id.
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had the power to require that cable owners originate programming.
This meant that the cable owner was required not only to have the
facilities at the head end of a cable system to video tape perform-
ances but also to assure that some performances actually occur.
Throughout most of its history cable television has had one pri-
mary function: the retransmission of signals and programming al-
ready available over the air. However, cable television offers
through a large number of channels the capacity to feed additional
programming into homes. To do this will cost money, both for the
additional equipment necessary at the head end of the cable system,
and also for the actual programming to be transmitted. Of these
factors, the latter is the more significant.
The cost of the head end equipment is substantial, but reasonable
in light of the size of systems to which the requirements apply.
Comments in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking in
United States v. Midwest Video indicated that the cost of the equip-
ment required an annual outlay of less than $21,000 for black and
white systems and less than $56,000 annually for color systems." To
put this in perspective, the requirement applied only to systems of
3,500 subscribers and above. The Commission calculates that such
a system would have revenue of approximately $300,000 per year at
the prevailing charge rate of $6.50 per month. 8 This works out to a
77. 406 U.S. at 671. Justice Douglas wrote in dissent in United States v. Midwest Video:
Compulsory origination of programs is, however, a far cry from the regulation of
communications approved in Southwestern Cable. Origination requires new invest-
ment and new and different equipment, and an entirely different cast of personnel.
T .. he idea that a carrier or any other person can be drafted against his will to
become a broadcaster is completely foreign to the history of the Act, as I read it.
. . . There is not the slightest clue in the Act that CATV carriers can be compulso-
rily converted into broadcasters.
The plurality opinion performs this legerdemain by saying that the requirement of
CATV origination is "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's power to regulate
television broadcasting. Id. at 677-80 (citations omitted).
In a footnote, Justice Douglas refers to the portion of the opinion by Chief Justice Burger that,
"reaches the same result by saying, 'CATV is dependent totally on broadcast signals and is
a significant link in the system as a whole and therefore must be seen as within the jurisdic-
tion of the Act."' Id. at 680 n.2. The idea is that the cable owner, as a price of taking the
broadcast signal and retransmitting it, must also "take the bitter with the sweet." (Justice
Rhenquist's words in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974)).
78. 3,500 subscribers x $650/month x 12 months = $295,750. To obtain 3,500 subscribers,
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cost per subscriber of less than fifty cents per month for a black and
white system. The access rules and the minimum twenty channel
capacity rules apply to similar size cable systems.79
However, the potentially most significant costs involve the pro-
duction of programming to fulfill the program origination require-
ment. It can easily cost $500 to produce a single hour of program-
ming.80 Yet the Eighth Circuit in Midwest Video"1 quite clearly con-
sidered that the mandatory access-rules went far beyond the issues
involved in United States v. Midwest-Video. 82 The plain fact, how-
ever, is that if there is cable capacity to carry the access channels,8
a system must, in general, serve a community having a population of 25,000 or more. 1976
Report supra note 12 at 303.
79. See note 13 supra, and especially 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252(a), 76.254(a) (1978).
80. The cost of program production of broadcast quality can easily reach far higher figures.
The show "Wonderwoman," for example, costs $150,000 per hour. For cheaper production,
$50,000-75,000 is a reasonable figure. Non-broadcast quality production can be far cheaper.
But, at the minimum, an hour of programming requires about one work day and, with free
help, will cost $500. The Catholic Television Network in Chicago charges $550 per hour for
equipment, studio, and production area. It could easily take a full day of work, however, to
end up with an hour of tape [i.e. $3,000 plus]. Telephone interviews with Jim Kosub, Video
Director, Media Services, Loyola University of Chicago, and with the Catholic Television
Network, Chicago (June 7, 1978). One of the most important variables in cost is the time of
the people needed to do the production, both to operate cameras and other equipment, and
to serve as actors, writers, etc. Most cablecasters depend largely upon public access groups
to produce what they put on the cable. Such groups depend upon volunteers, and beg, borrow
or rent equipment to videotape their productions.
81. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1039. "But that form of 'access' [in United States v.
Midwest Video] was not the mandatory access required by the present rules. Nor did that
form of 'access' involve the extensive and expensive construction, and equipment purchase
and installation, required by the present rules." Id.
82. 406 U.S. 649.
83. The rules would require that many systems convert from 12 to 20 channels. There is
also a greater per-mile cost for new construction of a 20 channel system as opposed to a 12
channel system. The cost of conversion may range from $200 per mile (replacement of one
component in the cable), up to $5,000 to $7,000 per mile for complete replacement of the plant
in rural areas. Replacement of the plant in densely populated metropolitan areas will be more
complex and more costly. However, an overall industry estimate is $1,500 per mile either to
replace or to modify the line amplifiers including any necessary splice repairs. Variables that
may render these estimates less than precise are the quality and complexity of the plant
equipment already in place; the extent to which the increase in bandwidth affects attenuation
and thereby necessitates amplifier spacing changes and splicing repairs; and the difficulties
involved as population density increases, i.e. rural versus metropolitan replacement. Inter-
views with David G. Reiser, Assistant Director of Engineering, National Cable Television
Association, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1978); and Arthur A. Kraus, Cable System Opera-
tor, Rockdale Cable T.V., in Joliet, Illinois (Dec. 12, 1978). It is hard to understand, however,
why the cable system operators are so concerned about the 20 channel rule, for the current
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the costs imposed by the mandatory access requirements are com-
parable with those approved by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Midwest Video.8 The rules require the channels be made avail-
able free of charge."' Reasonable charges are permitted for the use
of equipment except in cases of live public access programs not
exceeding five minutes in length. 6 Thus, it would appear that ex-
cept for the channel capacity requirements, a reasonable case can
be made that the access rules are actually far less questionable than
the requirement of cablecasting approved in United States v. Mid-
west Video.' Yet there is no detailed discussion in Midwest Video
regarding why the requirement of building systems with 20 channel
capacity exceeds the scope of the jurisdiction recognized by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest Video.88
To the extent that the reason for this conclusion is revealed in the
Midwest Video opinion, it would appear in the one paragraph:
demand is for installation of 35 channel systems. A substantial majority of the new systems
now being sold are 35 channel capacity ones. Interviews with Richard Taylor, Regional Sales
Manager, C.-Cor Electronics, Inc. (major equipment supplier), in State College, Pennsyl-
vania (Dec. 19, 1978), and Kevin J. Leddy, Research Project Manager, National Cable Televi-
sion Association, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1978).
84. 406 U.S. 649. The economic impact of compliance with the 20 channel rule would mean
an average of about 65 cents per month additional costs per subscriber. This is only slightly
higher than the 50 cents per month per subscriber figure used by the Commission in United
States v. Midwest Video. See note 79 supra, and accompanying text. This 65 cents per month
figure is based on the following assumptions: 14,500,000 subscribers to cable television nation-
wide, 4,100 systems, 285,000 miles of cable in place, and an average monthly fee of $6.50.
When subscribers are divided by systems, the average number of subscribers is 3,600 per
system. This is only slightly above the FCC cut off point for the application of the rules. The
average number of miles of plant per system is 70 miles. The average monthly expense for
building or converting to 20 channel from 12 channel is $2,380, computed as follows: $1,500
amortized monthly over seven years at 11% interest = $33.90/month; rounding to $34/month
times 70 miles equals $2,380 additional cost per month. Average monthly revenue equals $6.50
times 3,600 which equals $23,400. (The $6.50 figure is conservative since it is based on data
current at 1976. See 1976 Report at 303). Additional monthly expense divided by average
monthly revenue equals $2,380/$23,400, or approximately 10 percent. Ten percent of the $6.50
average charge is 65 cents. National Cable Television Developments, National Cable Televi-
sion Association (NCTA), Washington, D.C., updated by telephone interview with Kevifi J.
Leddy, supra note 83. This is based on the NOTA year end estimates. The current estimate
is that the average fee charged per month is $7.00.
85. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(1) (1978).
86. Id. Cable systems have often leased surplus channels at a dollar a year. Telephone
interview with Jim Kosub (June 6, 1978), note supra 80.
87. 406 U.S. 649.
88. Id.
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The 1976 Report nowhere states, and the Commisson nowhere argues,
that these rules were created and applied to cable systems to protect
a broadcast station's "contour" as in Southwestern; or to require, as
in . . . [United States v. Midwest Video], the origination of pro-
grams, like broadcasters do; or to govern an activity involving the
airwaves; or to protect the growth of broadcast television; or to pro-
tect the public interest in continued broadcast television services; or
to protect broadcasting against "unfair competition" from cable, or
to allow the Commission "to perform with appropriate effectiveness"
its responsibilities for broadcast television. 9
In an appended footnote the court distinguished between the FCC's
purposes of the channel capacity rules "to promote the expansion
of communications services as well as the expansion of the public's
access thereto," and the FCC's purposes involved in the rules limit-
ing broadcast programs retransmittable to cable consumers, "to
insure that the interest of the public in maintaining a healthy com-
mercial television structure will not be undermined."9 The only
explanation for such distinction is that the court was asserting that
the legitimacy of the rules turned not on the financial burden they
created for the cable industry, but rather upon the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the purposes of the FCC regulation. Later the court
makes clear that it believes that this is "[tihe effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation
of television broadcasting." 91
However, the reference to the FCC's purposes taken from the 1976
Report is a reference to a part of the report where the FCC appears
to be trying to explain why the access and minimum channel rules
are not being applied to smaller systems.12 Earlier in that same
report the FCC asserted:
89. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1038.
90. Id. at 1038 n.30. The court failed to quote any part of the first sentence of 105 which
refers in part to "larger cable systems," and later to "cable syitems in general." 1976 Report,
supra note 12, at 326.
91. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1038 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable,
392 U.S. at 178).
92. The FCC Report is ambiguous at this point. In particular, it is not clear that the central
point in the Eighth Circuit's view of the case was intended to be handled in the last collection
of "Additional Matters" considered at the tail end of the lengthy 1976 Report.
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[W]e believe [the rules] can, if properly used, result in the opening
of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion of diversity
in television programming, act in some measure to restore a sense of
community to cable subscribers and a sense of openness and partici-
pation to the video medium, aid in the functioning of democratic
institutions, and improve the informational and educational commu-
nications resources of cable television communities.93
Later in that same report the FCC asserted that it believed the rules
under consideration "will further the achievement of long-standing
communications regulatory objectives by increasing outlets for local
self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and
that as such they are within the scope of the Commission's regula-
tory authority over cable television systems that has been upheld by
the Supreme Court."94
The FCC appears to believe that its statutory power includes the
power to encourage the available communication options in local
communities, and that its access and minimum channel rules will
facilitate that charge. The Court, however, construes the Commis-
sion's power narrowly to limit it either to direct regulation of CATV
or to regulation for the purpose of protection of over-the-air broad-
casting.9 5 The opinion by the Court is quite explicit about this:
"[lit is a 'reasonably ancillary' standard we apply, and it is the
1976 Report rules we review."96
B. Application of the Reasonably Ancillary Standard
In both Home Box Office 7 (the siphoning case) and in Midwest
Video, the failure of the FCC to justify its regulations in terms of
the reasonably ancillary standard was stressed. If there is any signif-
icant difference with respect to this issue between the two circuits,
that difference is that the D.C. Circuit in Home Box Office asserted
that the problem was that the FCC failed to sufficiently justify the
93. 1976 Report, supra note 12, at 296 (in regard to the access rules).
94. Id. at 298.
95. Houston E. and W. Tex. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,353 (1914) (The Shreveport
Rate Case) (recognizing the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to "foster and
protect interstate commerce . . ").
96. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1039.
97. 567 F.2d 9.
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anti-siphoning rules. 8 That court recognized that, "[b]ecause our
holding is so limited, it is possible that the Commission will, after
remand, be able to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for regu-
lating pay cable television."" The decision in Midwest Video leaves
no such opening. "However attractively the Commission's objec-
tives are interpreted, reinterpreted, or repackaged, regulatory ac-
tions forbidden as means to achieve them within its statutory juris-
diction cannot be considered 'reasonably ancillary' to that jurisdic-
tion."100
Nor is the quarrel just with the means chosen, for the opinion
elsewhere states, "the [FCC] Act, however broadly read, contains
no objectives so broad as to encompass whatever is necessary to get
everybody on television. If that major foray be a legitimate goal, it
must be established not by the Commission or the courts, but by
Congress."101
This last comment leads to the central issue in these cases-the
interrelationship between Congress, the FCC, and the courts. The
relationship between the courts and the FCC is basically controlled
by the scope of review. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the scope
of review to be applied in these cases is that contained in section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).102 Close examina-
tion reveals that APA section 706(2)(A) primarily controls. It pro-
vides that the reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' Since the regulations involved in these cases were not
regulations required to be made on the basis of a record, the
"substantial evidence" test of APA section 706(2)(E) does not
apply. 0 4
The difference between these two tests is obscure, to say the least.
98. Id. There is irony in the fact that at one point the court cites the channel access rule
held invalid in United States v. Midwest Video as a basis for striking down the rule involved
in Home Box Office. Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 34.
100. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1048.
101. Id.
102. 567 F.2d at 35 (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1976)).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
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Professor Davis, for example, finds at least four different views
about the relationship of the two tests in recent Supreme Court
decisions. 05 It is not even clear which is to be considered the more
stringent standard of review."'6 Whatever the relevance of the pre-
cise verbalisms, the most crucial question is what the courts do with
these tests, and in particular, in cases such as Midwest Video, the
question becomes how to apply the scope of review standard in a
situation of rulemaking when that rulemaking involves guesses
about the future. To be certain, those who profess to know the future
are either fools or charlatans; however, the FCC has been told to
make rules based upon its judgment of the impact those rules may
have in the future. While jurisdiction is neither acquired through
"visions of Valhalla"'0 7 nor through "rhetoric in praise of objec-
tives," ' 8 it is conferred through statutes. Midwest Video deals with
a situation in which the FCC has determined in its informed, expert
opinion that it does have jurisdiction.
It is possible to agree with Professor Jaffe that "[iln judicial
review, the court must evaluate the relevance and weight of expert-
ness,"10 9 without agreeing that it is proper for the court to substitute
its judgment about the wisdom of action by the agency. Whatever
the meaning of the verbalisms about scope of review, it is clear that
the substitution of judgment is at the core of what the courts are
not to do on review. The court's opinion in Midwest Video contains
such strong and vivid language that it is hard to emerge from read-
ing it without believing that there is some degree of substitution of
judgment. The temptation to do this, for judges with "strong policy
105. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 649-52 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
K. DAVIS].
106. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (the substantial
evidence test affords "a considerably more generous judicial review than the arbitrary and
capricious test available in the traditional injunctive suit"), with Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1974) ("The District Court properly
concluded that, though an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence...
it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious action.") But see Verkuil, The ErAerging
Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 258,324 (1978) (substantial evidence
subjects informal rulemaking to greater scrutiny).
107. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1045.
108. Id. at 1042.
109. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMISTRATIVE ACTION, 579 (abridged student ed.
1965).
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commitments,""' as Professor Davis describes them, may be irre-
sistible on occasion.
The traditional conception has been that on review, so long as the
controversy centered upon issues of law, such as interpretation of
language, the opinion of the courts was to be primary. However,
when the issues became ones involving issues of fact, the expertise
of the agency deserved deference. The most difficult area of dispute
then became the area of "fact-law" distinctions."' The determina-
tion of the jurisdiction of an agency as specified by statute appears
at first blush to be an issue of law, and thus an issue in which the
controlling voice ought to be judicial. However, a closer examination
reveals that the interrelationship between fact and law becomes so
significant that some deference ought to be accorded the agency
determination as to its own jurisdiction.
Moreover, the practical impact of a determination based upon the
absence of jurisdiction is far more drastic than a "remand to the
agency to do it right.""' The best parallel area of law is that of a
determination by the Supreme Court that some statute is unconsti-
tutional because it violates the due process clause of the United
States Constitution."3 That disenables both the states and the fed-
eral government from acting at all. The abortion decisions illustrate
such a situation. A whole area of potential regulation by state and
federal government was thereby written beyond regulation."' There
is, to be sure, less of an impact when the determination is based
upon a finding that the federal statute does not confer jurisdiction.
Congress can, and may, amend the statute to alter the determina-
tion. By contrast, in the constitutional decision, the only recourse
is a constitutional amendment.
110. K. DAVIS, supra note 105, at 654, § 29.01.
ill. See W. GELLHORN AND C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 427-84
(6th ed. 1974); L. JAFFE AND N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 978-
1018 (4th ed. 1976).
112. "Administrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only
for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute . . . not simply
because the court is unhappy with the result reached." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (citations omitted).
113. See the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson in Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949).
114. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 9 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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However, a remand to Congress in a significant number of situa-
tions may be tantamount to a guarantee of no regulation, for Con-
gress may simply not act for a large number of reasons. Professor
Wechsler in another context aptly described the situation:
National action has ... always been regarded as exceptional in our
polity, an instrument to be justified by some necessity, the special
rather than the ordinary case . . . .Even when Congress acts, its
tendency has been to frame enactments on an ad hoc basis to accom-
plish limited objectives, supplanting state-created norms only so far
as may be necessary for the purpose. Indeed, with all the centralizing
growth throughout the years, federal law is still a largely interstitial
product, rarely occupying any field completely, building normally
upon legal relationships established by the states."5
When Congress has acted, however, thereby overcoming inertia,
logrolling, and other myriad forms that political group opposition
might take, and reached by that action some consensus embodied
in a law, then that action and consensus deserve the widest scope
of application. As Justice Holmes put it, "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,""' but nei-
ther does the Administrative Procedure Act enact "deregulation" as
social policy.
One of the major reasons for the establishment of administrative
agencies is an attempt to allow experts to decide various compli-
cated technical questions. Obviously, this was one of the factors
which led to the creation of the FCC. The complex, confusing regu-
latory problems in Home Box Office and Midwest Video exemplify
the wisdom of such a decision." 7 The ability of Congress to deal with
such a remand decreases as the technicality of the issues increases
and the size of the interested pressure groups decreases. Moreover,
practically speaking, the likelihood of the Congress deciding to do
something depends on its members' individual (and staff) ability to
judge the wisdom of the position taken by the FCC. The virtual
impossibility of determining the impact of the FCC rules in these
115. Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism, in SELEC==D EssAYs ON CONSTTUTONAL
LAW 185, 187 (1963).
116. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
117. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
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cases precludes such judgments. Ultimate responsibility for the ab-
sence of any regulation thus rests on the shoulders of the courts, and
usually the United States courts of appeals, since the Supreme
Court will intervene but rarely."'
However, it may be argued that this misses the entire point. A
declaration that an agency has acted beyond its scope of authority,
as granted by the statute, only reflects the appropriate deference to
the legislative consensus reflected in the statutory scheme. This
power to police the agencies through the ultra vires principle is the
essence of the ability of the courts to control administrative excess.
Moreover, regulation of cable television is an area in which Congress
reached no consensus, for Congress never specifically legislated
cable television."19
That response is, however, only to reflect the question in a way
not unlike the treatment of the question of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison. ,20 The crucial question is not whether action
beyond the authority of the Constitution or statute (in Midwest
Video) is permissible; all agree it is not. The crucial question is, who
determines whether the action is beyond the authority?' 2' Such de-
terminations are anything but clear cut.' 22 If one recognizes that
they are questions of degree,'2 one should also recognize that many
observers claim to have discerned the total bankruptcy of the non-
delegation doctrine with respect to Congress.' 24 For the courts of
118. Note in this connection the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court and the subse-
quent withdrawal of the rule in the Home Box Office case. 434 U.S. 829 (1977), petition for
rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 988 (1977), rule withdrawn, Dec. 23, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 64348.
119. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. As a result, a Senate Subcommittee Report,
Cable Television: Promise versus Regulatory Performance, Subcommittee on Communica-
tions of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives,
94th Congress 2d Sess. (1976), describes the FCC as having backed into regulation of cable
television because of its potential negative impact on conventional broadcasting at 27.
120. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
121. See Judge Gibson, in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawl 330 (Pa. 1825).
122. Compare the opinion by Justice Chase in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
150, 153 (1796), "but if the court have such power [judicial review] I am free to declare, that
I will never exercise it but in a very clear case." Judge Learned Hand once wrote, "So much
of what we do is not a case of barbara celarent anyway; but of more or less." Letter from
Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter (March 30, 1949), quoted in Freedman, Review, Delega-
tion of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 307, 329 n.113 (1976).
123. Jaffe, Book Review, 14 VILL. L. REV. 773 (1969) (K. DAVIS, DIsCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY).
124. See for example the Section titles in 1 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d
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appeals to seize on the ultra vires version of the non-delegation
doctrine, raises the specter of the practice condemned by the Su-
preme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council'5 but under a different and more danger-
ous rubric. The agencies would prefer to have a crack at proper
regulation on remand, under additional procedural requirements,
than to be powerless to act in what they perceive to be the public
interest. And if Congress fails to catch the ball on remand, or juggles
it for a number of years, the public interest may be irretrievably
prejudiced.
The impact of that upon cable television regulation is clear. If the
20 channel rule cannot be applied until Congress speaks, then whole
cable systems may be built that turn out to disserve the public
interest several years down the road. Mandatory access may stimu-
late demand and produce substantial commercial viability years
earlier than would otherwise occur. No one knows. But like the
decision by Robert Moses not to reserve a median strip down the
expressway towards John F. Kennedy airport in New York to permit
future construction of a rapid transit line, the decision is in the
practical world irreversible.'25 As Justice Rehnquist stated for the
Court in Vermont Yankee:12
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it
may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear
energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are
to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy questions appro-
priately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not
subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of
judicial review of agency action. Time may prove wrong the decision
ed. 1978): § 3.6, Supreme Court Indifference to and Acquiescence in Delegation with No
Standards; § 3.7, Supreme Court Participation in Delegation of Power without Meaningful
Standards; § 3.5, Valid Delegation without a Standard and without an "Intelligible Princi-
ple." Another scholar has described the necessary standards as "ceremonial incantation."
Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: Some Reflections, 81 L.Q. REv. 357, 372 (1965).
125. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (where the Court commanded the courts of appeals to refrain from
requiring additional procedural devices in administrative rulemaking proceedings subject to
A.P.A., § 553).
126. R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 920-58 (1974)
(Chapter 40, Point of No Return).
127. 435 U.S. at 557-58.
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to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the states within their
appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgment. In
the meantime courts should perform their appointed function.
A reasonable argument could be made that the reasoning of Jus-
tice Rehnquist applies to the cable television area as well. By the
time of the decisions by both courts of appeals in these cases, both
Congress by its inaction and the Supreme Court by its action have
approved FCC exercises of power in the area. It is hard to justify
writing certain squares of the game board off limits without a very
strong case.
V. THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP-INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS
One way to frame the issues is to approach them from the view-
point of institutional competence. What, if any, special justifica-
tions do the Congress, courts or agencies have to review and control
certain kinds of determinations? To approach the area from such a
viewpoint, one must start with the identification of the areas of
strength of each of the various competing institutional claimants.
The easiest area to define is the agency's strength-a claim at
expertise and specialized knowledge with respect to the field of regu-
lation. Associated with this is the ability (through the use of large
staffs) to sort through the masses of data that may be relevant and
to base judgments upon that data in the light of "industry" experi-
ence. Congress generally lacks this sort of strength. However, Con-
gress does possess at least two institutional strengths. First, it repre-
sents individual constitutents and their viewpoints, and second, it
has great powers of legitimization. The latter reflects the perception
that not only should decisions be correct, but just as importantly
they should be perceived as legitimate. The strengths of the judicial
system include the appearance of impartiality, also a kind of legi-
timization. More important, however, in this context is the role of
the courts as a decision-maker with particular skill in the examina-
tion of reasons and justifications for regulatory activity.
Application of these generalizations in the context of delegation
problems is far from simple. Several cases may illustrate some as-
pects of the problem. If an issue is likely to involve broad public
interest, and to appear relatively simple, a remand to Congress may
be justifiable. For example, the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service
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Co. v. Wilderness Society2 8 effectively remanded to Congress the
issue of allowing the award of attorneys' fees in civil rights actions.
Congress responded rather rapidly through statutory amendment to
section 1988 of Title 42.119 Both wide public interest and the simplic-
ity of the issue in terms of policies of racial justice, drew on Con-
gress's special claims to institutional competence.
Kent v. Dulles'30 and National Cable Television Association'3' re-
flect similar situations involving an issue likely to have wide public
interest and a surface appearance of simplicity. In Kent, the issue
was the validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
State which required passport applicants to "subscribe, under oath
or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past mem-
bership in the Communist Party.' 32 Because of the possibility of
serious constitutional questions, the Court refused to find that Con-
gress had authorized such a regulation. 33 In National Cable Televi-
sion Association, the issue involved the authority of the FCC to
impose fees on cable television systems based upon the number of
subscribers. The statutory language quite clearly authorized the
FCC to consider in assessing these fees the value to the public of the
regulation.'1 The Court indicated that if all that was being consid-
ered was the value to the recipient of the regulation, then there was
no problem.'35 However, fees based on the value of the regulation to
the rest of society smacked of taxation.' '6 Because the Court saw
constitutional issues lurking in the background, it interpreted the
statutory language narrowly so as not to permit a tax. 3 1 If Congress
128. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended by Act of Oct. 19, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-559 § 2, Stat.
2641.
130. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
131. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
132. 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952).
133. 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958).
134. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970):
[Tihe head of each Federal agency is authorized by regulation . .. to prescribe
therefore such fee, charge, or price, if any, as he shall determine . . . to be fair and
equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the Government, value
to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts ....
The statute is a general one and not limited to FCC activities.
135. 415 U.S. at 341.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 342.
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wanted to delegate the power to tax, it would have to say it more
explicitly than already set forth in the statute. In both cases then,
the Court adopted the remand principle. However, in both cases,
the issue was relatively simple. One could expect Congress to make
the underlying policy choice in both cases, and consequently derive
some better idea of the direction that the courts were to follow.'35
In both cases, large numbers of people were directly affected by
easily understood regulatory systems.
In all three cases, the remand to Congress left the agency with
clear policy alternatives from which to choose. The congressional
action in Alyeska Pipeline and the inaction subsequent to Kent and
National Cable Television Association provided substantial guid-
ance to the courts about the wisdom of the direction that the Su-
preme Court had taken. Thus, the results in a practical sense evi,
denced use of the institutional strengths of Congress in what it can
do itself, as well as what it can be expected to tell other constitu-
tional actors (the courts and agencies) about their functioning.
Another interesting instance of reference from one constitutional
actor to another was the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. After some eleven years of study by judges, Congressmen,
lawyers and other interested parties, the Supreme Court established
the new Federal Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972.'11 Justice
Douglas dissented on two grounds. First, he doubted that Congress
had given the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of
evidence.'40 Second, he noted that the Court had neither written the
rules, supervised their writing, appraised them on their merits,
weighed the pros and cons, nor ought to have done these things. 4'
Justice Douglas said, "We are so far removed from the trial arena
that we have no special insight, no meaningful oversight to contrib-
ute.' ' 2 Congress reacted by passing a statute prohibiting the rules
from becoming effective before Congress approved them.'4 3 After
138. In neither of these cases did Congress act.
139. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
140. Id. at 185.
141. Id.
142. Id. Justice Douglas continued, "The Rules of Evidence-if there are to be
some-should be channeled through the Judicial Conference whose members are much more
qualified than we to appraise their merits when applied in actual practice." Id. at 185-86.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1973).
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further consideration by committees in the House and Senate, Con-
gress amended in part the prior version and enacted them into
law."4 At the same time, Congress answered the first objection of
Justice Douglas by clarifying the power of the Court to promulgate
such rules.'45 In addition, the Congress reversed the relationship of
congressional action towards rulemaking by the Court. With one
exception,'46 unless Congress acts affirmatively either to delay or to
postpone the imposition of an amended rule, the amended rule au-
tomatically goes into effect. 4 ' "We determined .. that while re-
quiring affirmative congressonal action was appropriate to this first
effort at codifying the Rules of Evidence, it was not needed with
respect to subsequent amendments which would likely be of more
modest dimension."'" The possibility that worthwhile amendments
might languish because of the press of business in Congress was
specifically recognized by both the House and Senate reports.'
The Federal Rules of Evidence rulemaking process thus evidences
recognition by two of the constitutional actors of their own institu-
tional handicaps. Justice Douglas saw that the minimal experience
of the Supreme Court in the realm of trial proceedings disentitled
it from claiming special competency in formulating rules of evidence
about such proceedings.' Congress recognized by contrast that it
had the competence to set the basic direction of policy in the new
code of evidence, but that future action should primarily be en-
trusted to the agency (the Supreme Court in this instance).
144. Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1929 (1975).
145. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2076 (Supp. 1978).
146. "Any ... amendment creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall be approved
by Act of Congress." Id.
147. Id.
148. S. REP. No. 93-1277, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R, Evid. 799, 818 (1975).
149. Id. at 818; H. REP. No. 93-650, reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. at 823, 839 (1975).
150. The Supreme Court routinely, however, considers appeals containing focused ques-
tions about particular rules of law. Rarely does it legislate in a manner so as to promulgate
broad schemes of rules. When it does, it can expect criticism. E.g., the abortion decisions,
Roe v. Wade, et al, cited in note 114 supra. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Tribe, Forward: Towards a Model of
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973), for just a sample of
some of the articles which followed the abortion cases.
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Intervention by Congress sua sponte in the context of Federal
Rules of Evidence may be explained by the relative clarity and
broad popular interest in the proposals.'"' Thus Congress can and
will intervene when public pressure raises sufficient doubt about the
propriety or wisdom of particular "agency" action. Other examples
of such intervention by Congress include the ban on cigarette adver-
tisements on television'5 2 and the prohibition of a ban on the sale of
saccharin.'5 3
These examples are useful in illustrating the viability of
"legislative review" and also in illustrating the kinds of issues that
Congress rightly or wrongly believes itself primarily competent to
review. The fact that Congress has not spoken directly about certain
subjects may mean that it perceives that it has little to say, or that
congressional energy is better spent elsewhere.
When the courts themselves are having difficulty coping with
massive agency records and complicated sets of issues, it is difficult
to see what can be accomplished by a remand to the legislative
151. This is not to say that congressional intervention in this area has gone uncriticized.
See Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 1 (1974). The authors
asserted: "Court procedure can best be regulated by the judiciary, the governmental branch
most familiar with it, and the Supreme Court's prestige and general supervisory role make it
the logical rulemaking body." Id. at 38. To support this conclusion the authors cite: lack of
staff, the press of other business, politics, and the opportunity for more reflective considera-
tion in the context of the advisory committee scheme employed by the court. Id.
152. Banzhof v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (under the Fairness Doctrine televi-
sion stations that carried cigarette advertisements were required to devote a "significant
amount of time" to warning the public about the hazards of cigarette smoking.) By the Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970), Congress banned cigarette advertise-
ments from television after Jan. 1, 1971. The FCC then indicated it would no longer be
concerned if a station failed to carry anti-smoking ads. Cigarette Advertising-Antismoking
Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453 (1970), sustained in Larus and Bros., Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d
876 (4th Cir. 1971). But see the discussion by Judge J. Skelly Wright in dissent in Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587-89 (D.D.C. 1971), where he indicated that
the reason for the passage of the ban on television cigarette advertisements was the belief by
the tobacco industry that anti-cigarette advertisements were having a devastating effect on
cigarette consumption. For further background see, H. LINDE AND G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES, 915 et seq. (1975). It is hard to determine whether this is a victory
or a defeat for advocates of the merits of the legislative process.
153. Pub. L. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977). For the legislative history, see [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3921 et seq. Congress required that any proposed changes in the law
regarding saccharine be brought to Congress first by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. See note following 21 U.S.C.A. § 343 (Supp. 1979).
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body. The questions involving the 20 channel rule and the access
rule are not simple. Nor is the "siphoning" issue a simple issue.
VI. THE Home Box Office REMAND: SEARCH FOR CONSISTENCY OR A
HOBGOBLIN HALF WAY TO VALHALLA?
The treatment by the Court of Appeals in the Home Box Office
case of the "anti-siphoning" rules differs from Midwest Video in
that the Home Box Office court permitted the FCC to try again to
justify the anti-siphoning rules.'54 In particular the court stated:
"[W]e do require that at a minimum the Commission, in develop-
ing its cable television regulations, demonstrate that the objectives
to be achieved by regulating cable television are also objectives for
which the Commission would legitimately regulate the broadcast
media."'5 5 Although the opinion is a bit obscure, it appears to have
disturbed the court that the Commission failed to demonstrate the
consistency of its anti-siphoning rules as implicit entertainment
format regulation in which case the FCC withdrew from scrutiny of
the entertainment formats of various station licensees., In effect,
what the court said is that it requires logical consistency (or ex-
plained inconsistency) between the apparent differences between
the results of two massive rulemaking proceedings. This smacks of
"judicial intervention run riot.' '5 7 It is not obvious why there is a
connection between the decision not to scrutinize an individual sta-
tion license transfer from one holder to another based upon whether
hard rock or classical music will be broadcast, and a determination
that it might not serve the public interest if all major feature films,
or the world series, etc., were bought from free commercial televi-
sion by cable interests.
Vermont Yankee clearly prohibits the continued importation of
new procedural requirements by the United States courts of appeals
in rulemaking, and thus would appear to raise questions about that
part of the Home Box Office decision that imported a no ex parte
communications procedure into rulemaking.' 8 However, the agen-
154. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 34 (1977).
155. Id.
156. Entertainment Formats, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976).
157. Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. at 1218.
158. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51 (1977). The court made a passing remark
in regard to ex parte communications that is revealing.
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cies can still be the object of continued overintervention by the
courts through either of two techniques. First, issues can be framed
as jurisdictional issues, and thus allow courts to use the remand to
the legislature route as commanded in Midwest Video. Alterna-
tively, the court can claim to employ what is admittedly judicial
expertise and sharply scrutinize the justifications articulated by the
agency. A sequence of remands to the agency can become the rubric
behind which the court hides its policy disagreements. At some
point the agency is likely to give up trying.'59 Two related passages
illustrate this last point. The Home Box Office court said:
We have similar difficulties with the second cardinal assumption of
the Commission, i.e., that "siphoning" would lead to loss of film and
sports programming for audiences not served by cable systems or too
poor to subscribe to pay cable . . . . To reach such a conclusion the
Commission must assume that cable firms, once having purchased
exhibition rights to a program, will not respond to market demand
to sell the rights for viewing in those areas that cable firms do not
reach. We find no discussion in the record supporting such an as-
sumption. Indeed, a contrary assumption would be more consistent
with economic theory since it would prima facie be to the advantage
of cable operators to sell broadcast rights to conventional television
stations in regions of the country where no cable service existed.'60
Even if the Commission had disclosed to this court the substance of what was said to
it ex parte, it would still be difficult to judge the truth of what the Commission asserted
it knew about the television industry because we would not have the benefit of an
adversarial discussion among the parties.
Id. at 55. The court thereby indicated how accustomed it was to look upon proceedings in
front of it as adjudicatory and adversarial. In addition, the court may have indicated that it,
the court, expects to be able to judge the truth of what the Commission knows about the
television industry. Since the most important factor in this rulemaking proceeding is proba-
bly a judgment about the future, one has difficulty imagining how the court is to determine
the "truth" of that future.
159. The Three Sisters Bridge Controversy may be viewed with interest. See D.C. Federa-
tion of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert den., 405 U.S. 1030 (1972);
D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In concurrence, Chief
Justice Burger indicated reluctance to grant the writ because it would take almost a year to
decide. Chief Justice Burger then invited Congress again to act in the controversy, "even to
the point of limiting or prohibiting judicial review of its directives in this respect." 405 U.S.
at 1031. The words "in this respect" were added later by the Chief Justice. See Strong, Three
Little Words and What They Didn't Seem to Mean, 59 A.B.A.J. 29 (1973).
160. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 39 (1977).
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With all due respect, the assumption made by the court has little
relevance to what the Commission was talking about. The Commis-
sion's view of the "evils" of siphoning clearly anticipated intermixed
areas where cable systems served some households, and other house-
holds in the same community were served only by broadcast media.
In that context, it is simply silly to postulate that a cable owner will
sell to the competing commercial broadcast station rights to sports
shows or movies that are a major reason for subscribing to cable.
The next paragraph by the court displays similar gaps and flaws
in reasoning:
We find the Commission's argument that "siphoning" could lead to
loss of programming for those too poor to purchase cable television
more plausible. Here again, however, we find that the Commission
has not documented its case that the poor would be deprived of
adequate television service and, worse, that the Commission, by pro-
hibiting advertising in connection with subscription operations, has
virtually ensured that the price of pay cable will never be within
reach of the poor. 6'
This paragraph requires the Commission to resort to multiple gazes
at the crystal ball. The failure of the Commission to document its
position regarding the deprivation of adequate television service for
the poor is not surprising, for that relates to future happenings.
Moreover, the Commission would have to engage in even more spec-
ulation about the nature of the advertising market for cable televi-
sion, likely rates, etc. The court must itself be postulating that
advertising could potentially make a difference. That seems doubt-
ful. 62
161. Id.
162. The question turns upon the marketplace economics that would obtain after some sort
of a shakeout in the marketplace. One (1974) estimate of the value of a subscriber to cable
television put the value at $60 per year, as compared to $45 per year of a viewer to a broadcast
station. L. Ross, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CABLE TELEVISION 20 (1974). If for no
other reason than wise marshalling of the limited staff resources of the FCC, a slow approach
to adopting new rules regarding the market support of commercial stations makes sense. Were
the Commission considering a new license, an existing licensee in a given geographical area
is permitted to raise the issue that there is not sufficient economic potential to support the
additional station. Herbert P. Michels (WAUB) 17 RAD. REG. (P&F) 557 (1958) made it clear
that a cost of this is risking the existent license. Few objectors are likely to risk this. Subse-
quently, these particular proceedings were terminated at the request of all parties, Atom
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All that one can reasonably expect from an agency that is charged
with regulation of such a complicated, rapidly changing area as
cable television, is signs of administrative vitality. The FCC's rule-
making activity described by Judge Markey as "consistently and
continually revised, unenforced, withdrawn, waivered and aban-
doned""' can be seen as describing the activity of a vital agency,
trying to do its best in a difficult area.
An excellent example of this vitality, and the determination of
reasons to abandon regulation by the FCC, occurred in the FCC's
Second Report and Order.'64 There the Commission determined to
withdraw its rules to prohibit the siphoning of "series" program-
ming.'6 5 The FCC observed that its perception of the developing
subscription television industry and conventional television mar-
kets has convinced it that siphoning is unlikely to occur even if there
are no regulations.'66 On the other hand, the FCC also noted that:
"It cannot be disputed that feature films and to a lesser degree
sports events now constitute almost the entire quantity of subscrip-
tion programming. The supply of this programming is relatively
fixed vis-a-vis both the conventional and the subscription television
markets."'' 7 Thus they refused to eliminate the restrictions on fea-
ture film and sports events siphoning.
VII. A HOT BUTTER KNIFE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING:
Midwest Video IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,'8 the Supreme Court, by a vote
of six to three, upheld the determination of the Eighth Circuit.'"9
Broadcasting Corp. (WAUB) 17 RAD. REG. (P&F) 560d (1960). Subsequently, the FCC took
some of the bite out of this requirement by agreeing that it would not advance the date of
renewal for an existing licensee. John Self 24 RAD. REG. (P&F) 117 (1963). Allowing cable
television to compete for limited advertising revenue could require an enormous number of
serious licensing determinations. In theory, a cable caster might end up with a major
"license" for a particular area. At the most, the issue seems suitable for limited experimenta-
tion in various kinds of television and cable marketplaces.
163. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
164. Second Report and Order in Docket 19554, 40 F.R. 52731, 35 RAD. REG. (P. & F.) 2d
767 (1975).
165. The television show "Wild Kingdom" is an example of "series" programming.
166. Second Report, supra note 164, at 770-71.
167. Id. at 771.
168. 99 S.Ct. 1435 (1979).
169. Midwest Video, supra note 2.
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The decision, however, turned not upon the jurisdictional issue but
upon the finding that the mandatory access rules "relegated cable
systems pro tanto, to common-carrier status.' '7 0 "The access rules
plainly impose common-carrier obligations on cable operators.","
While ignoring most of the issues dealt with by the Eighth Circuit,
the opinion for the Court by Justice White traced the history of
congressional considerations- of whether common carrier status
ought to be mandated for broadcast stations.
The Court had most recently considered that issue in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee. 72 In
that case, the Court rejected a claim that a broadcast licensee's
general policy of not selling advertising time to individuals or groups
wishing to speak on issues important to them violated the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 or the first amendment. Columbia
Broadcasting arose out of the refusal of a radio station to sell time
to Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) to air a
series of one minute spot announcements expressing BEM views on
the Vietnam war. The Court traced the history of the Communica-
tions Act with respect to congressional intent as to whether broad-
cast carriers were to be common carriers. "Congress specifically
dealt with-and firmly rejected-the argument that the broadcast
facilities should be open on nonselective basis to all persons wishing
to talk about public issues.' ' 73 Instead, after extended debate, Con-
gress adopted section 3(h) stating that, "a person engaged in radio
broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be
deemed a common carrier.' 71 4
The discussion of this issue in Columbia Broadcasting reveals
that the central concern of Congress was the limited number of
airways available, and the difficulty of administering such a system.
Senator Dill, for example, noted: "When we enter this field we must
determine how much to give to the Catholics probably and how
much to the Protestants and how much to the Jews."'7 5 Fear both
170. 99 S.Ct. at 1441-42 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 1442 (footnote omitted).
172. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
173. Id. at 105.
174. 48 Stat. 1066, as amended 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1968).
175. 412 U.S. at 108-09 n.4, quoting 78 CoNG. REc. 8843. See also the discussion by Senator
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of censorship as well as of administrative difficulties inherent in
allocating a scarce and limited resource appears to be the core con-
cern of Congress. However, it is not clear that this fear relates to
cable systems considering the excess capacity wrought by 20-
channel systems.
However, the opinion by Justice. White for the Court in FCC v.
Midwest Video not only found that the regulations made the cable
systems into common carriers within the terms of the Act, but also
determined that there was an extension on the past opinions of the
Supreme Court in CATV cases. Control by the cable systems on
content and composition was seen by the Court as having been
removed by the access rules. The Court-approved mandatory origin-
ation rules were interpreted as only ensuring that the cable opera-
tors would satisfactorily meet community needs within the context
of their undertaking.' The cable system retained full editorial re-
sponsibility. The Court thus rejected the FCC argument that it was
only trying to seek objectives that had been approved before. Justice
White wrote for the Court, "But [this argument] . . . overlook[s]
the fact that Congress has restricted the Commission's ability to
advance objectives associated with public access at the expense of
the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in broadcasting." 7 7 The
Court reaffirmed the view expressed in Columbia Broadcasting
"that section 3(h) embodies a substantive determination not to ab-
rogate a broadcaster's journalistic independence for the purpose of
• . . furnishing members of the public with media access."'' 8 Al-
though Justice White conceded that the text of section 3(h) does not
explicitly limit the regulation of cable systems, 7 1 the opinion raised
a slippery scope argument-the jurisdiction of the Commission
under section 2(a) would be "unbounded.""' Moreover, the Court
refused to defer to the expertise of the agency in interpreting its own
statute in the absence of Congressional guidance.' " ' Justice White
Dill and others at 67 CONG. REC. 12502-04 (1926), which indicates, as well, concern with equity
in allocation of such time as is available.
176. 99 S.Ct. at 1441.
177. Id. at 1445.
178. Id. at 1444 n.15.
179. Id. at 1444.
180. Id.
181. "Though the lack of congressional guidance has in the past led us to defer - albeit
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then quoted the "strains the outer limits" of Commission authority
language of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in United States v.
Midwest Video, and noted the outright rejection of a broad right of
access for the public to broadcast stations. '82
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote
a strong dissent. He noted that in the opinion of the dissenters the
mandatory access rule was less burdensome than the mandatory
origination requirement approved by the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Midwest Video.'13 The Commission abandoned the mandatory ori-
gination rule in 1974 because it found the mandatory access rule less
burdensome.' 4 This was not surprising, since, as is argued above,
one of the most significant restrictions of cable systems expansion
is the cost of such programming.' 85
However, the major thrust of the dissent is that section 3(h) is not
a limit upon Commission powers which otherwise would be within
its statutory authority, and, in any case, the term common carrier
does not accurately apply to the mandatory access rules. "[T]he
Court has misread the statute."'' 5
Section 3(h) provides:
"Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a com-
mon carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except
where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chap-
ter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.' 87
cautiously - to the Commission's judgment regarding the scope of its authority, here there
are strong indications that agency flexibility was to be sharply delimited."Id. at 1445. Justice
Stevens later responded to this by stating: "In past decisions interpreting FCC authority
under the Communications Act, 'we [have been] guided by the "venerable principle that
the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 121, (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381.) 99 S.Ct. at 1447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. See note 55 suipra and accompanying text.
183. 99 S.Ct. at 1446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1446 n.2.
185. See notes 77-88 supra and accompanying text.
186. 99 S.Ct. at 1446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1968).
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Section 3(h) is inapplicable, according to Justice Stevens, be-
cause it is not in a section of the Communications Act imposing
restrictions upon the FCC's power, but rather is in a definitional
section.' 8 Moreover, "the Conference Report 'noted that the defini-
tion does not include any person if not a common carrier in the
ordinary sense of the term'."'"8 Nor is this the first mandatory access
rule before the Supreme Court, for in the first of the cable system
cases, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., "I the rules at issue
required free carriage of any broadcast station into whose viewing
area competing signals were imported. With respect to these "free
carriage stations," there was absolutely no editorial discretion re-
tained by the cable system.
Moreover, a central theme of the dissent is that the approach
adopted by the Supreme Court had been rejected by the FCC. Jus-
tice Stevens quoted the FCC:
So long as the rules adopted are reasonably related to achieving
objectives for which the Commission has been assigned jurisdiction
we do not think they can be held beyond our authority merely by
denominating them as somehow "common carrier" in nature. The
proper question, we believe, is not whether they fall in one category
or another of regulation-whether they are more akin to obligations
imposed on common carriers or obligations imposed on broadcasters
to operate in the public interest-but whether the rules adopted pro-
mote statutory objectives.'
The dissent agreed that this was the appropriate response. More-
over, it went on to say that the Columbia Broadcasting case
"relied upon almost exclusively by the majority, is not to the
contrary."'9 2
We emphasized, as does the majority here, that "Congress has time
and again rejected various legislative attempts that would have man-
dated a variety of forms of individual access" . . . . But we went on
to conclude: "That is not to say that Congress' rejection of such
proposals must be taken to mean that Congress is opposed to private
188. 99 S.Ct. at 1446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1447 n.3 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934)).
190. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
191. 99 S.Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 59 F.C.C.2d at 299).
192. Id.
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rights of access under all circumstances. Rather, the point is that
Congress has chosen to leave such questions with the Commission, to
which it has given the flexibility to experiment with new ideas as
changing conditions require. 193
The core of the dissent then, is a coda to the theme of this article:
that maximum discretion has been accorded to the FCC by Con-
gress, so as to allow experimentation with different approaches.
Neither the Supreme Court, nor the various courts of appeals,
should interfere with the experimental process dictated by the com-
plexities of regulation in an imperfect world except on the clearest
of evidence. The Supreme Court chose to base its decision on the
combination of a doubtful definition of "common carrier," and a
case aptly distinguished by Justice Stevens for the dissent. The
result is that whenever the Court chooses to label some regulations
as "tantamount to common carrier" or "common carrier" regula-
tions, the FCC has no jurisdiction. Even more striking in context is
the fact that although the Eighth Circuit did discuss the common
carrier issue as apparently a minor part of the decision,'94 the Su-
preme Court failed to consider many of the issues considered more
important by the lower court. It is almost as if the courts wield
statutory terms of magic import, "jurisdiction," and "common car-
rier," just as Siegfried wielded the magic sword Nothung. If the
regulatory problems become too complex, it is simpler to cut
through them.
Moreover, the legislative language in context is "common carrier
for hire," not just common carrier.'9 5 As Justice Stevens noted in his
opinion, 9 ' common carrier was intended to be understood in the
ordinary sense of the term. The textual terms "for hire" only em-
phasize this ordinary sense meaning, for the fear of overcharging the
public was one of the principal reasons for separate regulation of
common carriers by the common law. Munn v. Illinois17 traced the
regulation of common carriers back to the third year of the reign of
William and Mary in which the charges of common carriers were
193. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
194. Midwest Video, supra note 2, at 1050-52.
195. See note 187 supra and accompanying text.
196. 99 S.Ct. at 1447 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934)).
197. 94 U.S. 113, 129-30 (1877).
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regulated. The preamble to the act stated: "And whereas divers
wagoners and other Carriers, by Combination amongst themselves,
have raised the Prices of Carriage of Goods in many places to exces-
sive rates, to the great injury of the Trade . .. ."I"
Two elements appear to constitute the core of common carrier
status: (1) compensation be paid to the carrier (which is normally
regulated to be at a reasonable level), and (2) there be an obligation
to take all comers. However, that obligation to carry extends only
so far as certain types of goods are concerned, goods that the carrier
normally carries.'99 A carrier who normally carries only people can-
not be forced to carry a load of coal as well. The peculiarity of a
common carrier of goods is that he is bound to convey the goods of
any person who offers to pay his hire."'
Within the context of this definition of common carrier, Columbia
Broadcasting0 ' dealt with whether Congress had forced the holders
of broadcast licenses to hold themselves open to serve all comers.
Justice Stevens wrote that the Columbia Broadcasting decision
meant that Congress did not so mandate, but said nothing about
whether or not the FCC might not try out some system of allocation
of rental time on broadcast stations for such purpose. Indeed, the
"Fairness Doctrine '20 2 is an excellent example of just such an asser-
tion of power by the FCC. However, in the case of the Fairness
Doctrine, the right to reply involves free time, not rental time. This
doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC. '203 However, in one of the earliest cases before the
FCC dealing with common carrier status and cable television, the
FCC emphasized that without an element of compensation, cable
television stations were not common carriers.
Fundamental to the concept of a communications common carrier is
that such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public offering to
provide facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of the public
198. W. & M. c 12; 3 Stat. at Large (Great Britain 481).
199. Johnson v. Midland Ry., 4 Ex. 367 (1849), 154 E.R. Full Reprints 1254.
200. Nugent v. Smith, 45 L.J.C.P. 697 (1876), 1 C.P.Dec. 423, 433.
201. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
202. 47 CFR §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1978) (all identical). The Fairness Doctrine
for cable systems is embodied in 47 CFR § 76.209 in substantially the same form.
203. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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who chose to employ such facilities and to compensate the carrier
therefore may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own de-
sign and choosing. '
Without the idea of compensation integral to the ordinary meaning
of common carrier, it is difficult to see how the mandatory access
rules are properly called "common carrier" rules.
As is customary with the Supreme Court in cases involving com-
plicated rulemaking, there is no discussion of the proper scope of
review by the courts of appeals.0 5 Instead, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on a minor part of the issues considered by the court below.
It may not be unfair to say that the overall impact of such treatment
belies the facial message of Vermont Yankee ' and encourages the
courts of appeals to intervene deeply into agency affairs when they
do not agree with the policies involved.2 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
Examination of the FCC's attempt to preside over the burgeoning
cable television industry indicates a serious attempt to deal with
very complicated issues. The FCC's main concern has been that
cable not seriously harm the broadcast industry. With this in mind,
it has attempted to control the direction and pace of development
of cable television. Its reversals of policy in some cases are indica-
tions that errors appear to have been made. But they are also indica-
tions of an agency trying to do its job. It is important that the courts
realize this situation, and interfere as little as possible. In SEC v.
Chenery Corp.211 the Court said: "The choice made between pro-
ceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency. '29 Part of that discretion must be exercised to determine
how general the rules should be. Another part of that discretion
204. Frontier v. Collier, 24 FCC 251, 254 (1958) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
205. See K. DAvis, note 105 supra at 651-52.
206. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
207. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: the APA, the D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REv. 345. See in particular the brief discussion of the Home Box Office case at 403-
04.
208. 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II).
209. Id.
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must relate to balancing the concerns of efficiency, cost, and accu-
racy. This may result in silly, illchosen, and wrongheaded rules at
times. Truth ultimately may be subject to the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle, i.e., ultimately unknowable. Courts may some-
times have to concede the same latitude towards agency activity.
As Clark Byse has recently written with particular reference to
the views of the United States court of appeals in the Vermont
Yankee context:
[S]uch a view appears to reflect insensitivity, undue self-confidence,
and lack of trust in the give-and-take of the political process. To
illustrate. . . insensitivity to the concerns of the agency in deploying
its resources to conduct its business, undue self-confidence in the
assumption that the court's procedural prescription is "best," and
lack of trust in the political process in failing to recognize that Con-
gress and the agencies do respond to representations by the public
and by private interests. 210
One only hopes that Professor Byse's confidence in the ability of
Congress to respond appropriately is well placed more often than
not. "But at some moment three or more appellate judges may sense
that 'justice' is not being done. At that point they may search for a
peg upon which to hang a decision."12' Judges are probably pretty
good at sensing injustice in the face of an individual and his individ-
ual problem standing before the bench. Their relationship to justice
and complicated administrative rulemaking is far less certain.
210. Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat
Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804, 1832 (1978).
211. Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 201, 209 (1970) (Kaufman is the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit).
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